What did the Supreme Court say in District of Columbia v. Heller?

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About this video

This video explains the reasoning of the majority and the dissents in District of Columbia v. Heller. Justice Scalia read the prefatory clause about a well regulated militia as context that does not limit the operative clause, which led the Court to strike down Washington, DC's complete ban on functional firearms. Justice Stevens argued for a militia-centric reading, and Justice Breyer argued that even an individual right can be regulated using a balancing test.

You'll be able to

  • explain the difference between the prefatory clause and the operative clause of the Second Amendment.
  • explain why Justice Scalia's reading of the clauses decided the outcome in Heller.
  • compare Justice Stevens's and Justice Breyer's dissents.

Key words

prefatory clause
The opening part of the Second Amendment, 'A well regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a free state,' which introduces the right.
operative clause
The part of the Second Amendment that does the work: 'the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.'
militia-centric interpretation
The view that the Second Amendment only protects bearing arms in connection with organized military service.
individual rights model
The view that the Second Amendment protects a personal right of individuals to keep and bear arms.
dissent
An opinion written by justices who disagree with the Court's majority decision.
balancing test
A way of deciding a case by weighing the government's interests against the burden on a right.
Transcript

It was a very narrow holding. This is very common for the Supreme Court when it enters into a new area of law, whether it's a First Amendment or any other provision in the Constitution. We set up the case that way. Really what Justice Scalia said is he acknowledged the differing views on the so called militia centric interpretation of the Second Amendment and the individual rights model. What he did was he passed the text that we started off with of the Second Amendment to try to articulate and identify the meaning of the different terms like militia and infringe. Basically, his conclusion was that the so called prefatory clause, the well regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a free state, really didn't carry a lot of weight. It didn't modify the operative clause, the right of the people to keep in bear arms shall not be infringed.

It really just provided some context. He argued, and I find persuasively, but others don't, that this was not unusual. There are other provisions, both in the United States Constitution and state constitutions and also federal laws like the Northwest Ordinance, where there are other prefatory clauses. We have one in Article I Section 8, that in effect to promote the useful arts and sciences. Congress has the authority to issue copyrights and patents, you don't have to show that your invention will, in fact, promote the useful arts and sciences or that your poem or your new cartoon or whatever will promote the useful arts and sciences to get a copyright. Once Justice Scalia and the other four justices in the majority embrace that understanding that the prefatory clause does not significantly modify the operative clause,

then the outcome was in effect determined because that's really the question. If you're really going to focus on the operative clause, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed you're definitely going to strike down a complete ban on functional firearms, which is precisely what they did in Washington, DC. Justice Stevens wrote what has come to be called the principal dissent, even though I think actually Justice Breyer's dissent has had more of an impact. But let's look at Justice Stevens dissent first.

Justice Stevens, joined by the other three justices in the dissent, took exception to Justice Scalia's characterization of the relevant history, his interpretation of the different provisions of the Second Amendment, and Justice Stevens really offered a different narrative. In which the militia centric or the idea that the Second Amendment really only applies in the context of some organized military service was the brust of that Stevens dissenting opinion. It was very well done. I did not find it persuasive, but I acknowledge that it was very well done, and other people do find it persuasive. Justice Breyer wrote a dissent, a separate dissent that all of the justices, including Stevens, also joined, in which he took a characteristically Steven Breyer approach, which is to say, look, even if the Second Amendment does protect an individual right, it's still not an absolute right.

We need to think through what would the scope of the right be? How much leeway do we give the government when it comes to regulating, not prohibiting, but regulating the exercise of this right. The constructed a balancing test, applied that balancing test to the law that was at issue in Washington, DC, and found that given a variety of circumstances, including the murder rate in Washington, DC, which is very high, the harm the guns can and demonstrably do, although I think they also can do a lot of good. But that at the end of the day, was really no business of the courts to second guess the policy decisions of the legislative branch when it comes to the regulation of firearms ownership, and the Supreme Court should stay out of it in essentially all but the most extreme cases, and he didn't feel that Heller rose to that level.

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